Policy. Rowh and ExWndl AIhm
Oev lopmont Eouornicls
WPS 636
This paper-a product of thc Office of the Vice President, Development Economics-is part of a larger effort inPRE to examine reforms in the Eastem European socialistcountries. Copies are available free from WotiddaB 1818 H SItreetNW.W.hirgon, DC20433. Pleas conWactrCI oua,k-Ym,ro=om S9-047, extension 39413 (22 pages).
The Council for Mutual! .onomic Assistance pwsent arrugemenits, marketizing the CMEA. (CMEA) was established by Bulgaria, Czechoreforming the CMEA. ad dissolvt de CMEA. siovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the In view of differens in Fe extent mid the speed Soviet Union in 1948 as a response to the of the reform efforts in Eastem European counMarshall Plan. But unlike the Marshall Plan it tries, the last altemative appeals most appropriprovided no financial assistance to its member ate. At the same time, the more developed countries and its activities were limited to trade CMEA countries should seek association with in the framework of bilateral and multilateral the EC, followed by membership. negotiations. Because of centralized decisionmaking, the lack of price signals, and the For the transitional period, proposals have bilateral balancing of trade flows, the CMEA becn put forward for establishing paymns countries failed to exploit their trade potential.
arrangements among the former CMEA counAnd although the smaller CMEA countries tries. These proposals have little to commend benefited from receiving Soviet encrgy and raw them as they would involve pro-iding credit on materials at low prices in exchange for often the basis of the mutual trade of the countries poor quality manufactured goods, these gains concemed rather than their total trade. And were more than offset by the losses suffered while clearing arrangements would bring some because of insufficient technical change and the benefit, the countries in question should pursue straightjacket of the socialist planning system. the objective of convertibility.
For the future of the CMEA, four alternatives present themselves: maintaining the Thc PRE Working P'apCe SCrics disseminaies the findings of work under way in the Bank's Policy, Reseach, and Extemal
AffairsComplex. An objective of lhc scries is to get these findings out quickly, cven if prcsentations arc icss than fully polished. l The findings, interpretations, and conclusions in thcsc papers do not necessarily represent official Bank policy.
Produced by the PRE Dissemination Center
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN EASTERN EUROPE
Bela Balassa* Section II will examine the issue of subsidization through trade. Section III will review the future possibilities for the CMEA, and Section IV will discuss proposals made for a payments arrangement among CMEA countries.
I. The Activities of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
The (1975, p. 747) .
For one thing, the centrally planned economies "saw, at best, limited salvationi coming from transposing the problems of rigid, physical planning to the regional plane" (Brabant, 1989, p. 70 were also 620-700 bilateral specialization agreements (Pecsi, 1981, p. 13) .
Specialization agreements assumed the greatest importance in engineering; among 120 multilateral agreements in effect in 1980, 87 concerned the engineering industries (Sobell, 1984, p. 237 (Brabant, 1988, p. 306) .
Another important area for specialization agreements was the automotive industry. An oft cited case is Hungary's specialization in buses produced by Ikarus. In turn, Hungary does not produce passenger automobiles that are manufactured in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland.
There is also specialization in light, medium, and heavy trucks. Also, the extent of specialization should not be overstated. Faced with supply difficulties from their partners, CMEA countries aimed at producing a wide range of products. Thus, it has been reported that Czechoslovakia and East Germany manufacture more than 70 percent of the range of machinery produced in the werld (Lavigne, 1990b, p. 6) .
And, specialization has been largely limited to final products; it has not extended to parts and components. Apart from the reluctance of the CMEA countries to rely on imported parts and components, which may not have corresponded to their specifications and often experienced delays, the pricing issue looms large in the case of these inputs. According to Lavigne, "a non- Opportunities for trade may also be foregone because of the lack of appropriate price signals. Domestic prices in the CMEA countries do not reflect resource scarcities and are divorced from prices in foreign trade. In turn foreign trade prices follow world market prices with a lag and often show considerable variations in bilateral relationships (Csaba, 1985, p. 15) . Under these circumstances, there is a risk that trade in particular commodities may involve a loss, rather than a gain, for the countries concerned and this risk tends to discourage trade among them.
At the same time, apart from relationships with the Soviet Union, there is an attempt to attain trade balance in individual commodity groups, in particular in "hard goods" and "soft goods" when the former, consisting largely of food, fuels, and raw materials, find ready markets in the developed market economies that is not the case for the latter, consistirig mainly of manufactured products.
These developments have reinforced the practice of bilateralism under which countries attempt to avoid having an export surplus that is not settled in convertible currencies. Thus, the transferable ruble is not transferable at all and a surplus earned in trade with one partner cannot be converted into goods from another. Bilateralism, in turn, limits the amount or trade.
Finally, mention may be made of the propositions dvanced by Holzman.
In his view, the formation of the CMEA led to trade destruction, in part because the CMEA member countries are poorly suited to trade with each other and in part because they greatly increased barriers a6ainst nonmember countries (1985) .
II. Is the Soviet Union Subsidizing its CMEA Partners through Trade?
Traditionally, it was assumed that the Soviet Union exploited the CMEA partner countries by turning the terms of trade in its favor. According to (Marrese and Vanous, 1983, sp. 43-44) .
The Marrese-Vanous estimates ware criticized on the grounds that the authors used excessive qualit; discounts to value Soviet imports and exports of machinery and equipment and Soviet imports of consumer goods; tne discounts ranged from 25 percent to 60 percent (Marer, 1984) . But these discounts are actually used in selling machinery and equipment as well as consumer goods in Western markets.
Objections may also be raised to Marer's argument, according to which the Soviets could not purchase CMEA-quality machinery in the West at the same discount at which the East European's sell in the West. Apart from the fact that CMEA-quality machinery is not available in the West, note that Western exporters offer the Soviet Union a variety of advantages in the form of flexibility, service, and opportunity for product buy back that are not available on the part of CMEA suppliers.
It has also been suggested that relative scarcities differ between the CMEA and the world market, leading to lower relative prices of primary products in the former case (Brada, 1985, p. 89) . However, the world market prices offer the releva.nt benchmark as they represent opportunities foregone for the CMEA countries.
At the same time, there is a source of subsidization of the Soviet
Union by the other CMEA countries that lies outside the Marrese-Vanous framework.
This is the provision of capital for joint projects, such as the Odenburg gas pipeline. This subsidization is due to excessively sow interest rates of 2 percent, much below Euromarket rates of 9-10 percent that may provide an appropriate benchmark, given the extensive use of convertible currencies in extending credit. In the absence of the necessary data, however, the extent of this subsidization cannot be gauged.
Finally, questions arise about the interpretation of the reasons for which the Soviet Union grants subsidies to its partner countries. According to
Marrese and Vinous, the reason lies in these countries providing noneconomic benefits to the Soviet Union in enhancing its security. Thus, "the allegiance of East European countries can serve as a substitute for the use of Soviet labor and capital in providing security services to the Soviet Union. Because tl.
Soviet Unior. is the dominant power within the CMEA, we contend that it utilizes this trade-off. In other words, the Soviet Union engages in preferential traAe with Eastern Europe relative to the rest of the world in order to maintain the allegiance of the East European countrries" (1983, p. 10).
Marrese and Vanous further suggest that the ranking of countries by per capita subsidies also provides a ranking by noneconomic benefits the Soviet Union obtains through subsidization. The ranking is East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. One may argue, hvwever, that this ranking is simply the result of the composition of trade between Soviet Union and its partner countries. Thus, East Germany and Czechoslovakia rely largely on Soviet fuels and raw materials in exchange for manufactured goods.
In turn, during the period under consideration, Romania purchased practically no Soviet fuel and Poland could limit its reliance on Soviet fuel by reason of its extensive coal deposits. The estimate for 1987 may be on the low side. Thus, according to Hungarian estimates it may cost Hungary $1.5 -2.0 billion to adopt world market pric s in its trade with the Soviet Union from January 1991 onwards (Lavigne, 1990a, p. 13 and Le Monde, January 12, 1990 ). Brada (1985) and Koves (1983) "We believe that the efforts to overhaul the integration mechanism and to construct a qualitatively new model of intra-community cooperation would be centered on the creation of a single market of the CMEA member countries, complete with a free movement of goods, services and other factors of production. The need of such a market stems objectively from the logic of economic reforms in the individual socialist countries, which are centered on the promotion of commodity-money [market] relations" (cited in Schrenk, 1990, p. 1) .
Marketization within the CMEA would establish an EC-type integration.
But this presupposes that all CMEA member countries undertake far-reaching economic reforms, involving transformation into market economies. This is not in the cards.
While Poland shocked its economy with its January 1990 reform, despite its earlier reforms Hungary is proceeding at a slower pace and Czechoslovakia envisages a slow transformation of its centrally planned economy.
Also, Bulgaria has gone no further than declaring its intention to reform and the situation in Romania remains unsettled.
Finally, the Soviet Union has made little progress in perestroika after five years. While in early 1990 indications were that a major reform effort was in the offing, the announcement made in May 1990 concerned only price increases. These increases were subsequently withdrawn and it is questionable how far the reforms under preparation will go.
If neither the maintenance of present arrangements within the CMEA nor its marketization present a desirable or feasible option, the question arises if the CMEA could survive through a reform. This is the alternative envisaged by Lavigne who argues that it fits in with the regionalization proceeding elsewhere in the world. At the same time, Lavigne expressed the view that "the countries of Eastern Europe deceive themselves if they expect eventually to be integrated with Western Europe" (1980a. p. 9).
This statement relegates the Eastern European countries to an economic backwater. Rather than integrating with Soviet Union, where the prospects for reform are at best murky, the Eastern European countries want to become developed market economies. In so doing, integration into the EC offers an important avenue.
Nor can it be assumed that the EC would reject countries that carry out far-reaching reforms in decentralizing and privatizing their economies. In fact, the EC is prepared to eventually accept European market economies as new members if they agree to adopt its rules and regulations. In this connection, reference may be made to Greece and Portugal that were not more developed economically than the Eastern European countries at the time of their application for membership.
Another argument against the dissolution of the CMEA has been put forward by Schrenk. According to him, "a demise of the CMEA in consequence of a joint decision of all its members can be ruled out as implausible" (1990, p. But one member country, East Germany, is actually exiting from the CMEA without invoking Soviet retaliation. Rather, the Soviets wish to ensure that East Germany will continue to provide the products it had so far supplied to the Soviet Union.
Yet, East Germany is the second largest economy in CMEA and its departure will leave a hiatus in CMEA. Now, if Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and
Poland also exited, in practical terms CMEA would cease to exist.
At the same time, the maintenance of preferential ties with their CMEA partners is not compatible with these countries wishing to become developed market economies. In fact, their interest lies in ha-ing preferential ties with the EC that combines the majority of European developed countries.
Thus, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland would favor the demise of CMEA and the establishment of preferential ties with the EC. Initially, this would involve unilateral preferences granted by the EC but full membership could be envisaged in a decade or so.
In awaiting membership in the EC, should the three countries envisage participation in EFTA? This is not recommended since EFTA membership is not a stepping-stone to EC membership. Also, several of the EFTA countries themselves wish to become EC members. Rather, an export surplus gives rise to a credit that remains frozen.
With the dissolution of the CMEA, trade balances should be paid in convertible currencies. Given the scarcity of convertible currencies in Eastern Europe, proposals have been made for payments arrangements. One such proposal has been put forward by Ethier (1990) .
Ethier suggests a monthly clearing of balances among Eastern European countries participating in a payments union, with mutual credit provided up to a certain limit. The clearing would also cover balances with nonparticipating Eastern European countries, assumed to include the Soviet Union.
This proposal draws on the experience of the European Payments Union that also involved a clearing of balances and provided credit up to a predetermined limit. But while in the EPU a third party, the United States, supplied the credits, the Ethier proposal envisages mutual credits by the participants. This provides no incentive for a creditor country to participate in the payments unions since it would use scarce foreign exchange to finance the deficit of the partner countries in their mutual trade.
The conclusion is strengthened if we consider that under the Ethier proposal, credit would also be provided for imbalances in trade with nonparticipating Eastern European countries. Thus, if country A had a deficit and country B a surplus in trade with the Soviet Union, country B would provide a credit.
Apart from the treatment of trade balances with nonparticipating Eastern European countries, the main problem with payments arrangements that involve the granting of mutual credits is that they are based on one segment of the balance of payments rather than on the overall balance. It is for this reason that the idea of a payments union was abandoned by ESCAP. Also, the payments arrangement in the Central American Common Market broke down as
Nicaragua ran large deficits in intra-group trade that were financed by Costa Rica and Guatemala, although these countries were in an overall deficit position (Michalopoulos, 1990, p. 10) .
A possible argument in favor of a payments union is that it contributes to the expansion of trade. This occurred in the EPU as countries dismantled their quantitative import restrictions. But such restrictions were dismantled vis-a-vis nonparticipating countries as well so that trade with these countries expanded also.
The Eastern European countries would also need to liberalize trade across the board. Such trade liberalization however does not require payments arrangements among particular countries th t would focus on their mutual trade rather than on their overall trade.
It may be suggested that, in order to avoid the problems resulting from large and persistent debtor and creditor positions and the need to finance intraregional, as opposed to global deficits, payments arrangements be established starting out from initial trade positions. But in Eastern Europe, it is precisely the initial trade positions of the cou t ies concerned that need to be changed since the price relations on which they are based are distorted (Ibid, .
But how about the outside financing of credits in a payments union of Easte:n European countries? Such an alternative has been put forward, entailing the creation of a fund of convertible currencies from which Eastern
European countries could borrow to settle trade debts with each other (New York Times, May 9, 1990).
Outside aid eases the problem of financing debtor positions within a payments union and removes the disincentive of creditors to participate in the union. But the benefit of the financial aid would accrue exclusively to debtor countries within the payments union as it would be based on balance-of-payments positions in mutual trade rather than the overall balance-of-payments position.
Yet, it is the latter rather than the former that provides a rational basis for the granting of outside credits.
These considerations indicate that the establishment of a payments union among Eastern European countries would not be desirable, irrespective of whether outstanding balances would be financed mutually or from the outside. One may envisage, however, clearing arrangements under which mutual credit is provided for a short period (say three months), with repayment at the end of the period.
A clearing arrangement would provide some savings in foreign exchange as countries could hold smaller reserves than would otherwise be the case. But the extent of savings through such an arrangement sibould not be overestimated as trade among the Eastern European countries (excluding the Soviet Union) amounts to only 15-30 percent of their total trade. At the same time, at the end of the three-months period, payment would need to be made in convertible currencies.
While a clearing arrangement provides some benefit to countries with inconvertible currencies, the goal should be to establish convertibility. This will take some time, given the difficult economic situation in which the Eastern European countries find themselves, but they should take measures to pursue the objective of currency convertibility.
V. Conclusions
This paper has reviewed the activities of the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance since its establishment in 1949. While specialization agreements have permitted exploiting economies of scale, technological progress has been slow. Also, the CMEA countries have not exploited their market potential, due to the centralization of decision-making, the lack of price signals, and ilateral balancing.
The paper has further considered the issue of subsidization of the partner countries through trade by the Soviet Union. The evidence supports the existence of subsidization that will come to an end, however, as world market prices will be used in intra-CMEA trade. At the same time, the Eastern European countries have suffered dynamic losses in the form of insufficient technological progress in their trade with the Soviet Union and being forced into the straightjacket of the socialist planning system.
As to the future of the CMEA, four alternatives have been considered: the maintenance of the present arrangement, marketization within the CMEA, CMEA reform, and the dissolution of the CMEA. The paper favors the last alternative and suggests that the more developed CMEA countries seek association with the EC, The paper also objects to payments arrangement among the former CMEA countries that would involve providing credit on the basis of their mutual trade rather than total trade. And while clearing arrangements would bring some betnefits, the countries in question should take measures to pursue the objective of convertibility.
